Neoliberalism and the Genealogy of Biopolitics (originally posted on An und für sich)

The humanities blog An und für sich is hosting a mini-series on the recent controversy on Foucault and neoliberalism. The following piece was originally posted on the blog as the first contribution to the series. Follow-up posts by Gordon Hull, Johanna Oksala, and Thomas Nail are/will be posted over the coming days.

Neoliberalism and the Genealogy of Biopolitics

Daniel Zamora’s edited volume Critiquer Foucault: Les années 1980 et la tentation néolibérale (Criticizing Foucault: The 1980s and the neoliberal temptation), published in November 2014 with Éditions Aden, has been hotly debated over the past few weeks on the philosophical blogosphere. My contribution to the conversation here has two main purposes. First, since the volume will remain unavailable for English readers until later in 2015, I want to give a brief overview of the chapters assembled by Zamora. Second, I’d like to offer some thoughts on an aspect that appears to me to be largely absent from discussions of Foucault’s relationship with neoliberalism, namely the hermeneutical salience of Foucault’s methodology. This is to say that Zamora et al.’s failure to engage Foucault’s methodology leads to a very specific reading, a misreading to my mind, of Foucault’s project. As opposed to their interpretation of Foucault as interested in the political claims made by neoliberals, I suggest that Foucault is concerned with the production of neoliberalism as a regime of truth (thanks to Andrew Dilts for his helpful comments here).

That Zamora’s collection has caused quite a stir has, I believe, more to do with Zamora’s interview with Jacobin Magazine, provocatively titled “Can We Criticize Foucault?,” than with the book itself. For many of the arguments presented in the volume are neither as revolutionary nor as provocative as the interview would make it seem. This is, in part, because Foucault’s relationship with neoliberalism has been subject to critical scrutiny by Clive Barnett (also here and here), John Clarke, Mitchell Dean, Andrew Dilts (also here), Colin Gordon (and here), Trent Hamann, Bernard Harcourt (also here), Nicholas Kiersey (as well as here and here), Thomas Lemke, Johanna Oksala, Jason Read, Keith Tribe, and Shannon Winnubst, but also because in addition to three new pieces by Daniel Zamora, Jan Rehmann, and Jean-Loup Amselle, the volume includes previously published work by Michael Scott Christofferson, Michael C. Behrent, and Loïc Wacquant. Moreover, the chapters in Critiquer Foucault are rather impressive in their careful evaluation as well as application of Foucault’s work. Based on his 2004 French Intellectuals against the Left, Christofferson’s piece, for instance, raises some critical points concerning Foucault’s account of power, but otherwise offers a nuanced explanation of Foucault’s arguably surprising endorsement of André Glucksmann as the result of a strategic alliance between the philosophers. Wacquant’s contribution, a condensed version of his conclusion, or “Theoretical Coda,” of his 2009 Punishing the Poor, draws on his work on the American carceral system to highlight the limitations of Foucault’s examination of penal practices in Discipline and Punish, but it is hardly surprising that Foucault’s account of the emergence of disciplinary mechanisms in eighteenth-century Europe must be modified when applied to penal practices under conditions of twentieth-century American neoliberalism. More provocatively, perhaps, Behrent, whose essay is a French translation of his 2009 article “Liberalism without Humanism,” argues that Foucault actually endorsed neoliberalism. Yet, he carefully situates Foucault’s alleged fascination with neoliberalism in the context of the political situation of post-war France and examines the significance of economic liberalism’s anti-humanism in rousing Foucault’s interest.

More provocative, perhaps, are the three new pieces by Zamora, Rehman, and Amselle, who diagnose a certain conservatism in Foucault’s late work. For Amselle, this conservatism is manifest in Foucault’s local strategies of critique and resistance, which he regards as representative of a paradigm shift from revolt to indignation. Foucault’s concern with the individual, illustrated by Foucault’s interest in the care of the self, as well as his focus on zones of autonomy, which has replaced an attempt to devise strategies for usurping power to change the world, is, Amselle says, eminently conservative and perfectly compatible with neoliberalism. Without being able to respond to this argument in detail, it is worth pointing out that, for Foucault, for resistance to be effective, it must operate on the same level as technologies of power. As a consequence, as Dilts rightly emphasizes, Foucault’s engagement with neoliberalism allows him to think about modes of being that are, precisely, alternatives to neoliberal forms of subjectivity.

Based on a very helpful discussion of the notion of governmentality, Rehmann criticizes Foucault for not examining liberalism as a practice. Rather, Foucault is said to “identify himself with his object of study without critical distance and remain at the level of empathetic and intuitive repetition” (146). He suggests that Foucault’s failure to adhere to his own analytic distinction, the multiple meanings he gives to the concept governmentality, and his inability to tie governmentality to structures of social domination result in a failure to grasp the relationship between domination and subjectivation under conditions of neoliberalism on Foucault’s part as well as on the part of those scholars engaged in Foucaultian governmentality studies. What is needed to bridge the gap between technologies of domination and technologies of the self, Rehman argues, is a reinterpretation of Foucaultian governmentality studies from the perspective of a critical theory of ideology. While I agree with Rehman’s criticism of an unreflexive and unmodified application of Foucault’s notion of governmentality to different contexts, his turn to ideology critique takes Foucault’s project in a decisively non-Foucaultian direction that, while certainly a worthwhile intellectual endeavor, risks distorting Foucault’s claims about (neo-)liberalism and governmentality. For Foucault is not interested in a history of ideologies, which evaluates discourses by reference to the accuracy of their representation of reality, but a history of the rules that make statements true or false, the norms and mechanisms that make use of these statements to manage and control the behavior of individuals, and the kinds of subject one can be in a context shaped by particular forms of knowledge and certain relations of power. Foucault’s lectures, then, should be read as an attempt to analyze neoliberalism as a phenomenon that not only plays out alongside the axes of knowledge, power, and subjectivation, but also elucidates how knowledge, power, and subjectivation take effect in a biopolitical regime.

A similar rejoinder can be made to Zamora’s chapter, in which he suggests that the late Foucault is sympathetic to and has, in fact, been seduced by and converted to neoliberalism. Zamora develops this argument on the basis of a reading of Foucault’s lectures Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics, among other texts, where he takes Foucault to rather faithfully accept neoliberal doctrine. As evidence for this claim he cites, among other things, Foucault’s statements about the negative economic effects of systems of social security, his taking up of the classical neoliberal argument that social security benefits the rich at the expense of the poor, and the fact that Foucault dedicates a long section of his lectures to the idea of a negative tax proposed by Lionel Stoléru. While Foucault indeed says and does these things, Zamora fails to recognize that Foucault is not speaking in his own voice but paraphrasing important representatives of neoliberal thought.

As Stuart Elden has pointed out in his reflections on Zamora’s Jacobin interview, “Foucault’s mode of reading texts often makes it look like he is agreeing with arguments, when he is really trying to reconstruct them, to understand their logic, and so on.” This way of reading is part of Foucault’s analytic strategy, which can be described in rather general terms as a kind of historical-philosophical inquiry that engages empirical historical content in order to uncover the conditions of possibility of discursive and non-discursive practices. Instead of trying to refer practices back to a single origin, fundamental principle, or first cause that made them necessary, he asks about the historically specific conditions that make them possible. To reveal the contingency of what appears to be necessary, Foucault proposes to uncover the history of the objectification of phenomena that are usually assumed to be objectively given. Employing a nominalist principle of reversal, he inverts traditional explanations of social, historical, or cultural phenomena and shows that they are not causing certain events, practices, institutions, laws, and so on, but are themselves effects of the things they are assumed to cause.

Foucault mobilizes two analytic strategies to pursue this critical historical-philosophical inquiry. The first one, archaeology, aims to reveal the historically variable conditions of possibility of systems of knowledge as they are expressed in scientific theories or invested in practices. As a “method specific to the analysis of local discursivities” (“Society Must Be Defended,” 10-11), archaeology is not interested in their truth or falsehood, legitimacy or illegitimacy, reality or illusion, ideology or scientificity, but in the epistemic ground on which these distinctions become possible. In other words, Foucault’s archaeologies seek to undermine claims to universal truth by showing that what counts as true and false at any given moment is historically contingent and variable. Yet, while a description of what has been said and done allows Foucault to show that the conditions of possibility of knowledge are contingent, this strategy is not enough to also say something about how the emergence of new ways of thinking, knowing, and acting becomes possible. To address this second question, Foucault deploys genealogy, the “indispensable historical other side to the genealogy of knowledge” (Psychiatric Power, 239), which operates as a “tactic which, once it has described these local discursivities, brings into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them” (“Society Must Be Defended,” 10-11). That is to say, genealogy traces the random events and contingent historical practices that constitute the conditions of emergence of systems of thought, whose internal structures are the object of archaeology.

Consider, as an example, Foucault’s genealogy of penal practices in Discipline and Punish, which opens by contrasting the public torture of Damiens the regicide in 1757 with Faucher’s rules for prisoners. Separated by a mere 80 years, each of these events, Foucault says, represents a distinct penal style. Foucault’s aim is not merely to describe and contrast these styles (the archaeological project), but to show how the transformation of punishment became possible (the genealogical project). To this end, he maps those disparate and unrelated practices, techniques, institutions, and mechanisms, whose colonization and co-optation gave rise to a system of disciplinary power. He thus shows that disciplinary power was not the inevitable result of a predestined historical process or the intentional doings of rational agents, but the accidental outcome of contingent events. To elucidate this new form of power, Foucault considers the writings of Jeremy Bentham, whose Panopticon he regards not as a normative model of penal practice but as the architectural figure of disciplinary power.

In the same way Discipline and Punish examines practices of punishment to develop a genealogy of disciplinary power, it might be argued that the lectures The Birth of Biopolitics constitute (part of) Foucault’s genealogy of biopolitics on the basis of a consideration of neoliberalism. In keeping with his effort to reveal the historical a priori, or the conditions of possibility, of discursive and non-discursive practices, Foucault wants to show how it was possible for neoliberals like Gary Becker or Lionel Stoléru to articulate their economic programs. He finds these conditions of possibility of neoliberalism in a biopolitical concern with the regulation and management of populations and in regulatory practices of environmental modification, whose genealogy Foucault traces from the Christian pastorate through a new art of government that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this genealogy of biopolitics, neoliberals like Becker function, in analogy to the architectural figure of Bentham’s Panopticon in Discipline and Punish, as intellectual figures, if you will, of neoliberalism. In light of my argument for a genealogical reading of Foucault’s lectures, then, Zamora’s claim that Foucault has “made his choice” between capitalism and socialism (111), right and left, seems to be missing the point of Foucault’s inquiries – for these categories, at least as we commonly understand them today, only make sense once the distinction between them has been accepted. Part of Foucault’s concern in his genealogy of biopolitics, however, is to map the logical space in which these distinctions become possible in the first place. Perhaps it is this interest in the historical a priori of the divide between “the Left” and “the Right,” rather than a clear taking of sides, that explains at least in part Zamora et al.’s unease with Foucault’s work on neoliberalism (I owe this point to Colin Koopman).

To say that Foucault’s writings on neoliberalism have to be read against the background of his genealogy of biopolitics is, of course, not to deny Foucault’s keen interest in neoliberalism, and specifically in the neoliberal understanding of the subject. Neither do I mean to suggest that Foucault’s lectures are the last word on neoliberalism and biopolitics. As he himself was well aware, genealogy is infinite and incomplete because not only are concepts, statements, and practices subject to continuous change, but empirical content can always be reexamined on different levels and according to a different periodization. Foucault, in other words, has given us a model of inquiry, which calls for a continuation and modification of his work in the form of our own genealogies of neoliberalism that are attentive to our own historical context. Such a project appears to me more interesting, more important, and also more in tune with Foucault’s ambition to write not for readers but for users who could borrow from his tool-box to pursue their own investigations, than the question if we can criticize Foucault.


CfP: Kristeva Circle

The Kristeva Circe is now accepting paper proposals for its third conference, which will take place September 10-12, 2015, at the University of Memphis. Please submit abstracts (500-750) words on any topic related to the work of Julia Kristeva to The organizers welcome submissions from across all disciplines. Abstracts should be suitable for peer review; include a separate document with name, paper title, affiliation, and contact information. The deadline for abstracts is January 30, 2015.

CfP: Italian Biopolitical Theory. Life, Power and Political Theology

Interrogation into the nexus between power and life, characterised by
Foucault as ‘biopolitics’, has been taken up by many thinkers in the
past twenty years. So much so that it is now justifiably perceived as
one of the most important fields in continental philosophy.  With the
desire to understand and confront the political stakes as well as the
more challenging concepts at the forefront of this exciting domain,
Italian thinkers have come to embody innovation in this field: Giorgio
Agamben, Roberto Esposito and Antonio Negri being good examples. Despite
many differences between thinkers, some clear themes, methods and
problems can be discerned – both traditional-philosophical (e.g. the
subject, political community, sovereignty, genealogy), and unique to
their approach (the logic-life relationship, biblical exegesis, etc.).

This conference aims to rigorously explore the nuances of these Italian
political philosophers, with the aim of making connections, drawing
conclusions and producing readings.

Some questions:

What scope does the inclusion-exclusion paradigm have?
What is the difference between the logic of immunity and the logic of
What or where is the locus of resistance?
Can economic determination be included within the concept of nuda vita?
How does the church (ekklesia) function?
What is praxis and what is the relationship between this new trend in
biopolitical theory and the Marxian tradition?
How is the macro-physics of power related to the so-called ‘micro-
What is the relationship between the oikonomia and the economy?

Keynotes confirmed so far

Prof. William Watkin (Brunel, London)
Dr. Michael Lewis (UWE, Bristol)
Dr. Lorenzo Chiesa

13th – 14th March, 2015.
Bristol, UK.
UWE Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy, [Again]

Papers will each last 30 minutes with 15-20 minutes for discussion.
We welcome abstracts (300-500 words) for papers on the topics in

Deadline for abstracts: January 16th, 2015.

To be sent, along with any queries to:

CfP: Beyond Bars: The Future of Prisons

Beyond Bars: The Future of Prisons

February 27-28, 2015

Keynote Address: Andrew Dilts, Loyola Marymount University

Plenary Panel: Lisa Guenther, Vanderbilt University; Kym Maclaren, Ryerson University; Joshua Dohmen, University of Memphis

Punishment has featured prominently in the development of Western political thought as a vital component of developing and maintaining a polity. Philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Mill to Foucault have engaged the use of disciplinary and punitive practices. In the public sphere, debates have been waged over the purpose of prisons, the morality of capital punishment, and the political status of incarcerated persons both during and after incarceration. Over the last decade, in particular, there has been an explosion in the number of discourses surrounding incarceration practices, capital punishment, and criminal law in the United States. Debates about the wars on drugs and terror, the school-to-prison pipeline, and the moral and legal status of capital punishment have featured prominently in the media and in the political landscape. Recent demonstrations in response to police violence have drawn attention to both the militarization of police forces and the disproportion of this violence directed at communities of color. In intellectual circles, solitary confinement practices, felony disenfranchisement, and the proliferation of the prison-industrial complex have all been scrutinized. This conference seeks to provide a forum for these discussions on the status and meaning of prisons, incarceration, and punishment. Particular questions of interest include but are not limited to:

  • What do figures in the history of philosophy have to say about punishment and what can we learn from them?
  • How does imprisonment, or any practice associated with the prison, affect our understanding of notions like the self and subjectivity?
  • What moral issues are raised by the prison or incarceration?
  • What epistemological issues do practices relating to the prison raise?
  • Does prison reform or prison abolition provide the more satisfactory or useful response to criticism surrounding prisons? What do these terms even mean?
  • What broader historical trend might the rampant use of imprisonment as a means of punishing criminal behavior signify?
  • Are there more just alternatives to current incarceration practices?
  • What does imprisonment punish?
  • Are the stated goals/ends of imprisonment aligned with its practices or effects?
  • What responses to imprisonment practices can we get from critical race, feminist, queer or trans*, disability, or intersectional approaches?
  • What do philosophical or theoretical treatments of these questions have to offer more practical pursuits like activism or prisoner’s rights advocacy?
  • What value does the practice of philosophy have for incarcerated persons?

Location: University of Memphis (Memphis, TN)

We welcome contributions from philosophers working from any orientation, as well as contributions from scholars in a variety of disciplines and contexts.

To submit, please prepare a proposal (500-700 words) for blind review in either .pdf or .rtf format.  Send the file as an attachment to with a body containing the title and the author’s name, contact information, institutional affiliation and status (graduate student, faculty member, independent researcher, etc.)  If accepted, final papers need to be suitable for a presentation approximately 20 minutes in length (roughly 3000-3500 words).

The deadline for submissions is November 22, 2014.

This conference is sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, the Lillian and Morrie Moss Chair of Excellence, and the Philosophy Graduate Student Association at the University of Memphis.

CfP: Violence and Embodiment

Duquesne University Women in Philosophy Conference CFP
March 21, 2015
Duquesne University

Violence and Embodiment
Keynote Speaker: Ann Murphy, University of New Mexico

Duquesne Women in Philosophy (D-WiP) invite philosophical papers that explore the relationship between violence and embodiment.  Given the enduring presence of violence in contemporary society as well as its lasting historical consequences, it is important to ask the question: How does violence shape both human existence and the meaning we associate with our experiences?  This conference will explore the connection between violence and embodiment, considering both past understandings and possible future directions for examining these issues.  We invite submissions that engage both contemporary philosophical discourse as well as those philosophical discourses that are primarily informed by perspectives grounded in the history of philosophy (or some combination of the two).

Please send full paper submissions to by December 1, 2014.  Each presentation will be allotted approximately 20 minutes.

Possible topics include (but are not limited to):
-violence and coexistence/community, sociality, culture
-violence and/in colonialism
-violence and the constitution of the self
-trauma and self-identity
-built space and the natural environment, ecophenomenology, labor, globalization
-shame, fear, empathy and violence
-agency, power, control
-vulnerability, intimacy, and violence
-violence and the politics of expression
-sexuality and violence
-violence, bodies, and post-humanism
-techniques, technologies, and structures of violence
-violence and inequality (race, class, gender, LGBTQ, dis/ability, etc.)
-the body, pleasure, and violence

CfP: 8th Annual Ida B. Wells Conference

Friday, December 5 through Saturday, December 6, 2014

University of Memphis

Call for Papers:

The Ida B. Wells Philosophical Association invites submissions of papers for the annual Ida B. Wells Philosophical Conference that will be held on December 5 – 6, 2014. We welcome submissions in all areas of study that engage the experiences of minorities including, but not limited to, African Americans, Latin Americans, and Americans of Middle Eastern descent, etc. The Ida B. Wells Philosophical Conference is dedicated to furthering interdisciplinary discourse regarding circumstances and problems such as gender, race, prejudice, sexual orientation, nationhood, etc. that confront minorities in the United States, as well as providing a context in which both minority undergraduate and graduate students can be connect and be encouraged in their philosophical aspirations.

Keynote speakers:

Linda Alcoff, Ph.D., City University of New York

Paul Taylor, Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University

Paper submission deadline: Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Eligibility for submission: Senior year Undergraduate and Masters students in the 2014-2015 academic year are eligible. (While submissions from all fields of study will be considered, preference will be given to students intending to enroll in a Masters or Doctorate program in philosophy the following academic year.)

Submission Instructions: Papers should not exceed 3000 words and are to be submitted electronically (PDF or Word) as an email attachment to the contact person below. Please provide an abstract of your submission, curriculum vitae, and a personal statement that you would like to be placed in the program of the conference upon acceptance of your submission. We will confirm receipt of submission by email within 24 hours of submission. We will also notify you (by the email address you provide) if you have been selected as a presenter for the conference. If you are selected as a presenter, you will have a total of 35-minutes allotted for your total presentation (20-minutes in which you present your written work, 10-minutes for questions from selected respondents, and roughly 5-minutes for answering questions from the audience).

Contact: Corey L. Barnes


Ida B. Wells Philosophical Association

University of Memphis

Department of Philosophy

327 Clement Hall

Memphis, TN 38152

CfP: Resisting Force and Discourse (Foucault Madness Conference)

The Foucault Madness Collective is now accepting submissions for their September, 2014 conference.  The conference is free and open to the public.

Deadline for abstracts is August 15, 2014.

Resisting Force and Discourse

Host: California State University, San Marcos

Date: Friday, September 26, 2014

Location: University Student Union, Ballroom

Keynote Speaker: TBA

The conference theme brings into critical light the way that bodies are marked and regulated by discursive practices and spaces, and institutional procedures. This operational force can take the form of juridical and normative practices.

Examples of juridical practices include but are not limited to current police protocols, immigration requirements, and sexuality-managing legislation. In their operation, these forces betray their impingement upon raced, gendered, and classed bodies. As such, the conference solicits papers that challenge neutral and objective neoliberal practices that ultimately regulate, disqualify, torque, and punish bodies at the margins of classification.

The conference theme further recognizes that the regulation of marginal bodies is not limited to institutional codes. Social norms are an essential disciplinary mechanism in the reproduction of the dominant order. Indeed, conformity to, or deviation from, norms designates which subjects are the proper recipients of accusation, disavowal, and injury. Denial of normative power can occur on multiple grounds including: sex work, living with HIV, body size, sexual orientation, and being gender-nonconforming. As such, the conference also invites papers that engage with the regulatory effects of normative power.

We highly encourage submissions from graduate students and advanced undergraduates for fifteen minute presentations. Academic disciplines and methodologies across the humanities and social sciences may be used. Research questions may include, but are not limited to:

  • How is the policing and norming of marginalized bodies represented in literature and film? Or, newer cultural mediums, such as MMORGs and internet spaces?
  • How do state regimes of punishment similarly besiege parolees and racial minorities?
  • Does the U.S immigration system constitute a branch of biopolitical administration?
  • What are the modern norms of surveillance that may be going unnoticed?
  • How is the human body a political site (i.e., hunger strikes, self-branding, gender bending, trans politics)?
  • What is the function of the citizen “Other”?
  • Do social norms challenge the viability of HIV+ persons as subjects proper, leaving only a dangerous corporality?
  • Which social norms are challenged through the undocuqueer identity marker and movement?
  • Do all white subjects possess normative power?
  • How do queer subjects challenge dominant procedures and norms through queer world-making practices? How is this portrayed in popular media, activism, etc.?
  • Where do we find alternative networks, spaces, and autonomous zones? How are they constituted (i.e., spaces of reprieve and crisis heterotopias)?
  • How do juridical and normative systems produce catastrophic violence that no one seems responsible for?
  • Finally, critical theory and psychoanalytic approaches to the conference theme are welcome.

 Submissions: Please submit a 250 word abstract to by August 15, 2014. In the email body include your name, institutional affiliation, and email address.

For any questions about the conference, or our bi-monthly reading group, please contact us at